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The A400M Project: From Flagship Project to Warning for European Defence 
Cooperation 
Abstract 
The A400M project was seen as a flagship European armaments cooperation project from its 
inception. It has been framed in two different ways: as a break with inefficient collaborative 
procurement practices (the commercial frame) and as proof that European interests would 
outweigh national ones (the European frame). The project’s well-documented difficulties 
show that neither frame was wholly persuasive, but this raises questions about the viability of 
EU armaments policy given that it rests largely on the same assumptions. 
 
Introduction 
"It should have been an ideal European program
1
,"  
Since its initial planning stages in the early 1980s, the A400M military transporter aircraft 
has been considered to be a flagship European collaborative procurement project. It gained 
political symbolism as the representation of the new beginning to European defence and 
security launched by the Franco-British Saint Malo Agreement, and became an integral part 
of the subsequent development of the European, now, Common Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP/CSDP) by showing sceptical onlookers that the Europeans were serious about 
addressing equipment gaps. The near collapse in 2010 when EADS chief executive officer 
Tom Enders threatened to scrap the project, if the participating countries did not renegotiate 
the contract, revealed that there were serious problems
2
. Difficult negotiations on a 
renegotiation began in March 2010 and the new contract was finalised in November of that 
year
3
 but even after the renegotiation further delays have occurred
4
. The transporter aircraft, 
which were supposed to come into operation in 2009, are now expected from 2013 onwards, 
four years late, and with a cost over-run estimated by auditors to be approximately €7.6 
billion. In fact far from being a flagship example of European defence cooperation, the 
A400M experience highlights some real problems for EU policymakers trying to create a 
European defence equipment market and a defence, technological and industrial base. Why is 
this? 
Firstly, the A400M project was supposed to be a model collaborative procurement project – 
an answer to the critics of the notoriously wasteful Eurofighter project with its time and cost 
overruns
5
. A new management agency, the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière 
d’Armement (OCCAR), had been established by Britain, France, Germany and Italy to 
manage collaborative defence procurement projects on a much more commercial basis 
drawing on best practice in procurement from the private sector. It was thought that giving 
management responsibility to OCCAR as an ‘arm’s length’ agency would also depoliticise 
and denationalise the collaborative procurement process. The A400M contract was supposed 
to be a fixed price contract with penalty clauses for delivery failures, which would transfer 
the risk to the prime contractor, Airbus Military Company, then a subsidiary of Airbus and 
now of EADS. The belief that European collaborative procurement could and should be 
managed on a more commercial basis went hand-in-hand with the aim of treating defence 
firms more like normal firms, freeing them from much state control and ownership but 
encouraging European level mergers to create ‘European champions’ capable of competing 
globally. In short, the A400M project is a good lens to examine whether the attempts to apply 
New Public Management methods to European defence procurement have been a success. As 
much of this rhetoric underpins the European Union’s practices and assumptions about the 
governance of the armaments sector through both the EDA and the Commission, it would 
seem an opportune moment to critically assess whether the A400M project suggests some of 
these assumptions are ill-founded. This reframing of the way in which collaborative 
procurement was to be carried out should have heralded a fairly radical recalibration of power 
relations within the arms procurement process and changed the way in which actors defined 
their interests and priorities. 
 
Secondly, the A400M project, as Joana and Smith argue, “is heavily marked by a change in 
the social representation of European cooperation in the arms field”6. As Mérand has argued, 
as the European security and defence field has been institutionalised, the practices, social 
representations and power relations of security and defence actors are fundamentally 
challenged
7
. Each domestic defence procurement decision involves a play-off between 
security, technological, industrial and political interests. The power relations between the 
different armed services, the defence firms and the bureaucrats and politicians alter 
depending on the context of each project and traditionally have varied between European 
states. The functional reasons for European armaments cooperation are clear: as Smith 
argued: 
“Collaboration helps reduce costs by sharing the R&D between the partners and in principle 
can provide learning curve and economy of scale benefits in production.
8.”  
In practice, however, collaborative procurement has all the complexities of a national 
procurement decision multiplied by however many states were involved in the project. 
Problems around control, delays due to different budgetary cycles, differences in 
requirements and national protectionism have led to a number of different systems of 
management being tried, but without much success
9
. As a result, with a few exceptions where 
commercial interests were strong enough to prevail (for example Franco-German missile 
projects like Milan, HOT or Roland) or political commitment was strong enough to outweigh 
all the problems (for example the Eurofighter) there have been more failures than successes 
in the post-1945 period
10
. The A400M project is the first operating with European institutions 
(OCCAR and to a lesser extent EDA), ‘European’ firms and with a common European aim 
(CSDP) – the extent to which this European field or frame has changed the actors’ 
perceptions of their interests and power relations should enable us to draw some conclusions 
about the likelihood of the EDA being able to act effectively. 
This article will therefore first offer an explanation of the theoretical approach towards 
framing European armaments cooperation used in the article. It will then use the A400M 
project as a case study to analyse two possible new frames for European armaments 
cooperation; firstly, the commercialised, depoliticised ‘new public management’ frame and 
secondly, the European motive. Both sections will consider the ways in which actors might 
have been expected to redefine their interests, power relations, practices and representations 
of the A400M and how this has compared with reality. The article will conclude by drawing 
some conclusions for the future of the EDA given that it draws on both frames in its 
assumptions and practices. 
 
Framing a Collaborative Project 
 
The article starts from the premise that there are multiple perspectives from which a single 
issue, in this case the A400M project, can be viewed. Framing is the process through which 
individuals develop their conceptualisation or ‘world view’ of an issue. It is argued that these 
policy frames influence the way issues are processed, what interests are deemed to be 
important and what type of policy coalitions or conflicts might emerge
11
. In the past, 
European armaments cooperation has been viewed through a prism of national interest 
(gaining the maximum possible for national defence firms for example or lobbying strongly 
for variations in the agreed requirement to suit national desires) and often pursued reluctantly. 
Even the armaments cooperation between France and Germany, which was avowedly about 
closer political and defence cooperation was more often a tale of national one-upmanship
12
. 
The European Defence Agency rests on the assumption that there is a ‘brave new world’ in 
European armaments cooperation since the development of CSDP that means the EDA might 
succeed in coordinating armaments policy when its predecessors in the Western European 
Union could not. A project like the A400M, which has become symbolic of a declaratory 
shift by policymakers on two levels (establishment of a commercial approach to collaborative 
procurement and the commitment to CSDP), offers a good opportunity to judge whether these 
new policy frames are sustainable and have substantial buy-in. 
 
It is more usual to analyse defence procurement through action-reaction models, domestic 
pressures or technological imperative arguments
13
, and indeed there is a good case to be 
made that bureaucratic politics arguments explain much about the way the A400M project 
developed, but the object of this article is to investigate the extent to which policy actors have 
adapted (or not) to the new framing of European armaments cooperation. Joana and Smith 
have contributed a detailed case study of France and the preliminary stages of the A400M 
project, arguing that in fact no real transnational space was established and that the policy 
constellation in France remained largely unchanged
14
. However, events in 2010, when the 
purchasing states bailed out the project, suggest that the commitment to the project is stronger 
than rational analysis might suggest. Indeed as one critic of the project, Siebert, pointed out 
the UK’s commitment in particular seems rather irrational and it was noticeable that one of 
only two non-European purchasing states South Africa did rescind its order in response to the 
revised cost
15
. Might this suggest that there is some evidence of changes in the way national 
actors understand the social representation of European armaments cooperation? 
 
 In common with Joana and Smith the article takes as a premise the concept that the national 
actors in defence procurement are constrained by an institutional order, which establishes 
rules, expectations and roles
16
. It is important to understand that the extreme longevity of 
European collaborative projects (and indeed defence procurement projects in general) means 
that they are often shielded from political scrutiny and change except at moments of obvious 
crisis. This, coupled with the symbiotic nature of the relationship between defence industry, 
procurement officials and the military, produces a dense institutional order, which strongly 
influences how the members think, argue and act to the extent that they are unlikely to 
challenge it. As Kier writes, 
"The culture of an organization shapes its members' perceptions and affects what 
they notice and how they interpret it: it screens out some parts of "reality" while 
magnifying others. Organizational cultures define what is a problem and what is 
possible by focussing its members' attention on certain features of events, 
institutions, and behaviours; how a problem is defined determines the range of 
possible solutions and strategies appropriate for solving it
17
."  
In other words institutional culture lies at the intersection of historical and sociological 
institutionalism perceiving institutions not only in their strategic and historical context but "as 
a set of shared understandings that affect the way problems are perceived and solutions 
sought"
18
. This shows how institutional culture can be both enabling and restrictive to both 
the institution and the actors. If this given framework is appropriate to the problem, then this 
causes no difficulties but, if changing circumstances challenge its appropriateness, change 
can be exceptionally difficult to instil. Training has already implanted the assumptions, norms 
and beliefs of the organisation and ensures that they will be reproduced.  This means that 
even when policy makers intend to redesign institutions their effectiveness is constrained by 
these embedded cultural constraints
19
. For a project like the A400M that comes at a time of 
great changes in the sector, this means the cognitive or normative framing of an issue at the 
outset matters to how it will be processed by the existing institutional order.  As Surel 
suggests 
“Cognitive and normative frames, which as a general expression bring together paradigms 
(Hall), belief systems (Sabatier) and référentiels (Jobert and Muller), are intended to refer to 
coherent systems of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given field, ‘world 
views’, mechanisms of actors subscribing to the same frame20.”  
The interest of the A400M project is that it offered a new institutional order, OCCAR, that 
needed to be adapted to and the project was framed on two levels as being a rupture with the 
past. Would this mean a reconfiguration of interests, the way issues were dealt with and what 
coalitions or conflicts would emerge? 
 
This article makes the argument that the A400M project has been given two different, if 
sometimes overlapping, frames. Firstly, as Joana and Smith argue, since its earliest days in 
the 1980s as the Future Large Aircraft Exploratory Group the perceived common need for a 
replacement air transporter has been perceived as a symbolic commitment to foster 
cooperation between European armies and defence firms and thus ‘extend a 
transgovernmental and transnational logic to the defence sector’ 21.The FLA rapidly became a 
regularly discussed item at Franco-German summits - Chancellor Kohl and President 
Mitterrand had added a protocol in 1988 to the Elysée Accords, which encouraged the 
development and deepening of co-operation in the armaments field in order to maintain a 
European capacity, and the FLA became emblematic of a desire to create and lead a Europe 
of defence
22
. With the launch of ESDP the A400M project became “a litmus test of whether 
Europe is serious about ESDP”23. Secondly, as Giegerich argues the A400M was much 
praised as bringing a commercial approach to multinational procurement after the Eurofighter 
fiasco
24
. The four founder members of OCCAR specifically designed an institution that had 
commercial principles of procurement best practice at its heart, and renounced the practice of 
juste retour in favour of a system of global balance
25
. How though might these frames have 
been expected to modify the behaviour of all involved? 
 
The European Commitment Frame 
According to the French defence ministry, "The A400M is the most ambitious military 
acquisition program in Europe. It constitutes a founding element in the European 
technological base and gives a decisive drive to a European defence and security policy"
26
. It 
is key to the aims and objectives of CSDP in that it would greatly improve the EU’s capacity 
to move troops and military equipment to crisis zones around the world. The initial interest in 
the project was because many NATO states had a shared requirement to replace their aging 
Lockheed Martin C-130 transporters (or in the case of France and Germany the Transall C-
160). Initially in the 1980s the US and Canada were involved but after Lockheed decided to 
concentrate on updating the C-130, the group became European. The seven states involved 
are Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and Turkey. Italy and Portugal 
were initially involved but left the project. France was keen from the beginning on a 
European solution and Airbus was initially asked to respond to the European Staff 
Requirement in 1997, however following a request from the British for a more open 
competition, there was an international call to tender in 1998 to which Airbus Industrie, 
Boeing and Lockheed responded
27
. Germany, for political and budgetary reasons had a 
preference for the Russian-Ukrainian Antonov 70, and so requested that the call for tenders 
was extended to Medium Range Transport Aircraft Russia. 
For most of the states involved the A400M and Airbus were obviously the preferred option. 
The decisions though of the UK and Germany were important for the process of framing the 
project as showing commitment to European defence. The 2000 decision of the Blair 
government to reject an American solution in favour of Airbus was seen as proof of its 
commitment to the Saint-Malo Agreement and the partnership with France on CSDP. This 
gave Rudolf Scharping, the then German defence minister, little choice but to opt for Airbus 
too or appear anti-European
28
 but there was little political consensus in Germany around the 
value of the project, which meant that it was politically challenging to get Bundestag 
approval to sign the contract and led to Germany reducing its order to get the necessary 
consent 
29
. This delayed the start of the programme by a year. 
The choice of Airbus as the prime contractor meant that the main construction work was to 
remain in Europe, but Airbus needed to sub-contract parts of the work to satisfy the ambitious 
technological demands of the purchasing states. The decision on the A400M engine was 
interesting: a Canadian Pratt-Whitney bid was considerably cheaper than the European EPI 
consortium’s30 and was the preferred choice of Airbus. Franco-British government pressure 
was put on the prime contractor though to allow the Europeans to resubmit their bid. 
Unsurprisingly following the British government’s decision to promise research funding to 
Rolls Royce, the European bid was able to sink its price and win the contract
31
. This decision 
to insist on a European solution was clearly about making sure important technological 
capacities (and new developments) remained in Europe and outweighed the commercial 
approach frame. The engine and its electronic control system (FADEC) were designed to be 
technologically innovative including the most powerful turbo-propellers in existence and had 
to be constructed from scratch. It is also the engine (and its FADEC) that is one of the three 
parts of the aircraft that caused the severe delays
32
. Masseret and Gauthier argue that the 
failure to realise the extent of the risk involved in the engine and its FADEC was at the heart 
of the problems
33
. 
But is the European commitment actually a sign of changed emphasis in the national 
procurement bureaucracies or merely a new variant of the well-established tendency to 
protect national defence industrial jobs? This is difficult to evaluate. For France, this time the 
A400M fitted both their national defence industrial interests and their desire for a Europe of 
defence (but France pulled out of the Eurofighter when a similar convergence was not in 
place and since the inception of CSDP has yet to be seriously tested on this front). Silvio 
Berlusconi justified Italy leaving the project by saying “this is a project that only interests the 
French industry and those who will produce the aircraft”34. Similarly, Masseret and Gauthier 
argue that Spain has only ever been involved in the project, because they wanted to 
strengthen the capacities of the Spanish aeronautic industry
35
. Germany too seems to have 
had little Europeanist thinking – they initially ordered more plans that their armed forces 
would need in what was thought to be a move to secure more German-based production, then 
cut their order before contracts were signed, and in August 2010 again cut numbers (from an 
initial 73 to 53). Even Britain, the country which on the surface seemed to be using 
participation in the A400M as proof of its commitment to CSDP, clearly had industrial 
concerns at stake when it manipulated the engine sub-contracting process. The case of 
Portugal is also interesting; the Portuguese left the project in 2002 stating that for financial 
reasons they had decided to buy the American C130J instead. However, it was widely seen as 
a political decision. At the height of the Iraq controversy, Portugal was keen to prove its 
Atlanticist credentials
36
.  
The proposed bail out of the project though shows an interesting dynamic that is new in 
European defence procurement – the concept of the project (and firm) that is too big to fail. 
"We hate you, but we don't want you dead,"
37
 basically sums up how many of the negotiators 
of the revised package felt about Airbus’ parent company EADS and the A400M. Masseret 
and Gauthier argued that the contract had to be renegotiated because the financial 
consequences would otherwise seriously weaken EADS
38. Enders’ threat that EADS would 
abandon the project if the contract was not renegotiated was not an empty one, given the 
consequences for the firm, which at the time seemed severe, although EADS’ financial 
situation has since improved considerably
39
. Essentially, there was no real question that the 
states would abandon the sunk costs of development, the future potential technological spin-
offs, a European place in the global aviation construction market and weaken a key European 
prime contractor, even if the firm had made serious errors of judgement. Maintaining 
European defence industrial capacities seemed to outweigh all other factors although both 
Germany and Britain were unhappy about it.  
 
So it would seem in conclusion that the framing of the A400M project as a litmus test for 
ESDP has only succeeded partially. There are strong arguments that national financial 
concerns and defence industry jobs are still paramount motivations. Moreover, the framing of 
the project as European made it a target for Italy and Portugal when they wanted to make 
political points. Nevertheless, the realities of the consolidation of European defence industry 
are forcing actors to think European. The question is whether too much power now rests with 
the firms. 
 
The Commercial Approach Frame 
 
The 1990s were marked by changes in the approaches of the key arms producing states in 
Europe towards armaments cooperation. Although the Eurofighter fiasco had left further 
doubts in the minds of policymakers about whether or not collaborative armaments 
cooperation was a viable way to procure major weapons systems, changing structural 
conditions meant that no state could dismiss cooperation as an option. In an era of falling 
defence budgets caused by the peace dividend, more cooperation was always going to be 
needed, particularly as the cost of defence technology rose.  However, it was the globalisation 
of the defence industrial sector provided the real impetus to cooperate. The dramatic changes 
in ownership and structures of the global (especially American and West European) defence 
industry in the 1990s, made states question their traditional role of control and direction of 
defence industry (some with more enthusiasm that others). Financial pressures meant that 
governments turned to commercial procurement practices to save money and began to act 
more as proper customers
40
. Moreover, states recognised that their defence firms, if they were 
to remain prime contractors, must merge and improve competitiveness. In order to maintain 
their favoured access status to their indigenous defence firms, many of the European states 
made the case that they must offer a good market and favourable research funding to 
maintain their defence industrial base. As Lovering writes, 
 
“One of the most important effects of the wave of neo-liberal thinking and 
attempts to reduce public spending has been the transformation of the defense 
firm into a commercial actor, rather than an agent of a Ministry of Defense. The 
leading European defense companies no longer operate as passive executors of 
government instructions and behave much more like normal corporations with 
normal business practices and managements. They cannot wait until groups of 
politicians and military committees have formulated a grand plan." 
41
 
Such conditions could only be offered in a collaborative arena. The major weapons producers 
seemed more aware of the need to act quickly to create such conditions than other European 
states and so were frustrated by the lack of progress in the Western European Armaments 
Group (WEAG). This frustration helps to explain the creation of the Organisation Conjointe 
de Coopération en Matière d’Armement (OCCAR) by a breakaway group of Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy. But while these states wished to sustain their defence industrial bases, 
they were also strongly influenced by prevailing trends in public policy at the time. 
 
The 1990s were marked by an acceptance by mainstream parties on the left as well as the 
right of key tenets of neo-liberal thought. Policies aimed at reforming the role of the state, 
particularly through deregulation and privatisation, were the norm and gained a sense of 
inevitability. The reforms to the public sector that took place from the 1980s onwards 
reflected this logic of market-based rationality: efficiency, competitiveness and 
entrepreneurialism were emphasised. While the traditionally heavily state-controlled, 
protected and subsidised defence sector was initially comparatively immune from these 
changes, the belief that competition rather than government intervention would bring 
economic efficiency came (most strongly in the 1980s in Britain with the Levene Reforms) to 
influence defence procurement practice too. As Hayward argues, 
“The defence industries had, in short, become an extension of national 
sovereignty. Within the protective shroud of national security, the defence 
business evolved more often than not insulated from commercial pressures and 
commercial disciplines. Large and complex procurement establishments defined 
needs and requirements, negotiated contracts with suppliers, oversaw 
development and imposed unique accounting and security restrictions on private 
enterprise.” 42 
Defence procurement was viewed as extraordinarily inefficient and European collaborative 
projects like the Eurofighter had become synonymous with national protectionism, 
duplication of resources, unaccountability and inefficiency culminating in significant cost and 
time over-runs. In keeping with the enthusiasm for apolitical arm’s length agencies to provide 
technical expertise, the establishment of OCCAR fitted the zeitgeist. 
 The new armaments agency was in fact widely hailed as a move towards more efficient 
European armaments co-operation
43
. The participating states saw OCCAR as a chance to end 
the inefficiencies of earlier collaborative projects, as it would use new methods of decision-
making, work share and procurement authority. OCCAR was given the powers to issue 
contracts on behalf of the participating states and to run the procurement procedures, which 
should have produced a more efficient and less expensive system. For example, rather than 
having a Programme Director from each country participating in a collaborative project, there 
would be a single Executive Director.  Qualified majority voting was also introduced for 
some decisions to ensure greater efficiency. In many ways OCCAR represented the ultimate 
technocratic response to the collaborative procurement problem.  
The intention also was to ensure OCCAR drew upon and represented best practice in defence 
procurement. As it says in Article 24 of the Convention, 
“OCCAR shall aim to adopt best practices for procurement and shall work with 
Member States to benchmark procurement practices against the highest 
standards.”44  
The commitment by OCCAR Convention signatories to abandon juste retour (the practice of 
allocating national work share strictly in accordance with financial commitment to a 
collaborative project) in favour of a global balance across a number of projects was seen as a 
particularly symbolic of a new beginning and a break with the past, not least because this 
decision was considered anathema to other WEU states.  
 
The A400M project was the first project to be managed from the beginning by OCCAR and 
should have reflected this new orthodoxy. In many ways it did, despite the issue with the 
engine sub-contracting process, but the commercial approach has been responsible for many 
of the problems in the A400M project. The selection of Airbus’s newly created subsidiary, 
Airbus Military Company, was intended to bring Airbus’s commercial experience in building 
civilian aircraft to bring rigour to the procurement. The problem was that Airbus had no 
experience in building military aircraft, was heavily distracted by problems with its key 
civilian aircraft project and had completely underestimated the risks inherent in the project
45
. 
Airbus Military Company also seems to have failed to monitor its sub-contractors closely 
enough, and the crucial engine part was being poorly managed because the EPI consortium 
lacked leadership and cohesion. IISS claim that design and development problems were not 
taken seriously enough within the wider EADS company and that it was unclear whether the 
EADS management were aware of the extent of the problems
46
. 
From a commercial perspective OCCAR succeeded brilliantly in negotiating a contract that 
promised a new aircraft with a new engine with considerable technological advances, at a 
very low price and in an unusually short time-span and without the customer paying for a 
programme of evaluation of technological rise (pre-development stage). The problem was 
that this was wholly unrealistic.  Moreover, the type of contract was as Masseret and Gauthier 
put it ‘eyes on – hands off’47. The idea was that neither OCCAR nor the purchasing states 
could change requirements or numbers – something which had happened frequently in the 
past and which had undermined the ability of contractors to stick to schedules or prices. 
However, when Airbus Military Company was managing the project poorly there was no lead 
nation to establish dialogue with the firm, and OCCAR, which could have acted as a 
replacement, had not been given decision-making autonomy on questions relating to 
operational matters and so had to return to the states and establish consensus on each issue, 
which delayed the decision-making process. The type of contract meant that political and 
audit scrutiny had not been as easy as usual and the problems seemed to have gone unnoticed 
for some time. When EADS finally did demand a renegotiation of the contract, the delays and 
problems were deeply rooted. 
The outcome of the commercial approach has not been as successful as its sponsors had 
hoped. Even in Britain, where its proponents were strongest, it is now broadly accepted that a 
commercial approach cannot be applied rigorously to defence procurement. However, the 
A400M project has convinced some that there are merits to this type of contract. French 
politicians are not usually found supporting the commercial approach but Masseret and 
Gauthier
48
 did urge caution in their report and suggested that it would be wise not to ‘throw 
the baby out with the bathwater’ and completely jettison the commercial approach. They 
were of the opinion that two elements were positive, namely through penalties making firms 
more responsible for delays and penalising states for withdrawing or lowering orders once a 
programme had started without justifiable reason. They also pointed out that, had EADS 
managed the programme better, then the civil-style contract would have allowed the aircraft 
to be completed faster than with a classic military contract.  
Neither is OCCAR given the blame – it was generally accepted that the agency had carried 
out its role correctly but that the constraints put on it by the states were too great to allow for 
the exercise of the efficiency benefits it could potentially have offered. France and Britain 
have shown sufficient faith in OCCAR to choose the agency to manage their new Maritime 
Mine Counter-Measures project, while the agency was also chosen to manage the Franco-
Italian Multinational Space based Imaging System - Federating Activities project
49
. 
Paradoxically, although the A400M is unlikely to be held up as an example of successful 
armaments cooperation, neither are the experiments carried out in procurement management 
likely to be abandoned. In this sense, you can argue that there has been adaptation and 
adoption to the new institutional order offered by OCCAR.  
However, even if OCCAR as an institutional framework is accepted, member states did 
undermine its procurement strategy. The most important limitations to the success of the 
commercial frame are the concept of firms that are too large to be allowed to fail and so 
cannot be held to contracts, and the continued unwillingness of states to accept that 
commercial logic may mean that work would go to non-European firms. As far as EADS was 
concerned, IISS claim that when the problems were admitted there were three possible 
outcomes. Member states could cancel the project, which would have a serious impact on 
EADS’ market credibility and thus its credit rating. EADS could cancel the project but would 
be liable for penalties and the reimbursement of payments, which PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(the firm employed by OCCAR to assess the financial aspects of the project in 2009) judged 
to be even an even more damaging financial outcome for EADS than a customer 
cancellation
50
. Or the purchasing states could agree to increase the price, which is what was 
agreed. As Siebert has argued, this was not necessarily a logical decision when viewed from a 
cost-value perspective, and the main export customer South Africa withdrew their order 
rather than agree a price increase
51
. If European defence industrial policy remains to 
encourage the consolidation of defence firms into European champions, its procurement 
officials will struggle to apply commercial logic to firms with a near monopoly, and which 
are too important across a range of projects to punish for failings on a particular contract. 
The other major limitation of the commercial approach demonstrated by the A400M project 
is that there is a continued insistence for industrial and technological policy grounds that 
work must go to European firms. Dickow claims that Airbus Military was the only politically 
possible choice as prime contractor (despite British and German efforts to open up the tender 
to other firms) but that this meant that this nourished unrealistic expectations on both the 
industry and government sides
52
. The purchasing states continued to add extra risk to the 
project through their insistence that the European consortium, rather than Pratt-Witney, be 
given the engine contract against the prime contractor’s wishes. IISS claim that this decision 
was made on the basis of defence industrial policy considerations rather than cost-value 
analysis. Similarly, IISS point out that the governments continued to insist on national 
variations for the transporter aircraft which complicated the project further
53
. In other words, 
although OCCAR and the commercial frame were meant to represent a new beginning to 
European armaments collaboration, in fact the purchasing states continued to engage in 
precisely the behaviours that have caused problems in earlier collaborative projects. 
 
A400M, the EU and Armaments Cooperation 
 
While the A400M can be added to a long list of difficult European collaborative procurement 
projects, it is perhaps the lessons it offers to those responsible for the EU’s attempts to foster 
defence capabilities improvements through the CSDP that are the most important. The EU’s 
approach to the armaments sector rests on two beliefs: 
 The supply side is too fragmented. Industrial consolidation and mergers are required 
in all sectors 
 The demand side is also too fragmented and both national procurement regimes and 
requirements need to be harmonised. 
The European Commission has legislated through the defence package of directives to 
introduce more market rigour into defence procurement (commercial or market approach), 
while the European Defence Agency (EDA) attempts to foster greater cooperation between 
the member states on research, procurement and industrial consolidation (European 
approach). The A400M project suggests that their aims may be difficult to achieve on three 
different grounds. 
Firstly, as Hartley points out Europe still has excess defence industrial capacities
54
. It is 
widely expected that a further round of defence industrial consolidation driven by French 
defence budgetary needs will take place in the next few years. The EDA’s efforts to foster 
greater cooperation therefore seem rather dependent on the European frame being viewed as 
credible enough, so that member states will be willing to give up national defence industrial 
capacity in the aim of maintaining capacity elsewhere in the EU. In other words, that the 
impetus of CSDP and growing solidarity will mean that states are willing to abandon parts of 
their defence prerogative.  Giegerich thought that the financial crisis and the defence cuts that 
it brought might give added momentum to this
55. However, the EDA’s own statistics show 
that spending on cooperation on defence research (in reality the precursor to any serious joint 
procurement project) has almost halved since 2008
56
. The A400M project suggested strongly 
that the European framing of the project was not sufficient to override national interests at 
present. As the CSDP has seemed to be largely stalled since around 2008, it is unlikely to 
offer a persuasive narrative for why this should change. 
Secondly, as the A400M case has shown the European and commercial frames are not always 
compatible with one another. Hartley points out that there are real conflicts between the 
desire for a competitive market-driven European Defence Equipment Market on the one hand 
and the interests of a European defence, technological and industrial base (EDTIB) on the 
other. He points out that if competition is desired, the EU has to allow non-European firms to 
enter the European market, but that this might threaten important defence industrial 
capabilities. If it chooses to protect the EDTIB then it will soon have to address the problem 
of public sector customers having to deal with mainly privately-owned monopoly defence 
firms – a problematic scenario already shown in the A400M problems with EADS. If the 
latter choice is made, Hartley warns also that there will be a need to subsidise those defence 
industrial capabilities deemed critical for the future when there is no immediate development 
or production needs
57
. It would seem that the EU is going to have to make hard choices.  
The third area of difficulty for the EU is to be found in the lessons learnt that key states are 
drawing from the A400M project. It is noticeable that the two states that are the most heavily 
committed to active national security policies and thus defence industrial capabilities, Britain 
and France, seem to be drawing similar lessons from A400M. The British Chief of Defence 
Material told the House of Commons Defence Select Committee in 2009: 
  "The lesson I draw from [the A400M project] is collective projects are essential. If you do 
not collaborate with partners, then you will not get the kit you want because the production 
numbers are so small. … if you have got seven or eight partners, they have all got a view … 
It is very difficult to cope with that. My preference would be a bilateral product which others 
could join. That would be my lesson." 
58
 
Masseret and Gauthier also argued in their report for the French Senate that juste retour must 
be abandoned in favour of using the best competences in Europe, and that there must be an 
end to projects where some participants are engaged not to improve their military capacities 
but their industrial ones
59
. The 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House defence agreements 
included a wide range of bilateral armaments projects in key areas such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles and complex weapons. Some of the defence industrial cooperation has the potential 
to produce European monopoly suppliers in what are viewed as critical future market areas. 
Pointedly the two states chose to cooperate outside the EU structures even though the Lisbon 
Treaty’s permanent structured cooperation clauses would have allowed the cooperation to 
take place within the EDA framework
60
.  While Franco-British cooperation may indeed 
produce much needed additional military capabilities for Europe, their industrial and 
technological policy agenda has the potential to concentrate the EDTIB in an even smaller 
group of countries than is already the case, which might make it difficult to persuade the non-
participant states to invest in defence capabilities and to buy European. 
In summary, the A400M project is significant on a number of levels beyond serving as yet 
another example of the difficulties of collaborative defence procurement. It shows that some 
of the assumptions made about the future governance of the armaments sector in the EU may 
be resting on rather shaky foundations. Neither the European nor the commercial frame 
proved wholly persuasive for the A400M states, but their experiences have shown that the 
two frames are also not entirely compatible. This suggests that sooner rather than later the EU 
will have to make some difficult choices, if they have not already been forestalled by the 
Franco-British initiatives. 
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